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TOURO LAW REVIEW
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
MacFarlane v. Village of Scotia
(decided July 3, 1997)
Petitioner, Timothy MacFarlane, a police officer in the Village
of Scotia, brought an Article 78 proceeding95 in order to "review
the suspension imposed against him for misconduct in connection
with a letter he wrote as vice-president of a police officers
association, which criticized the police chief's position regarding
the implementation of a 911 emergency call system." 96 In the
Article 78 proceeding the petitioner, MacFarlane, argued that his
right of free expression under the Federal Constitution,97 had
been violated. 98 The Third Department held that the petitioner's
letter would have been entitled to First Amendment protection
since the letter referred to a matter of public concern.'
94 659 N.Y.S.2d 351 (3d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 90 N.Y.2d 1008, 688
N.E.2d 1384, 666 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1997).
95 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 (McKinney 1982). This section states in pertinent
part:
Relief previously obtained by writs of certiorari to review,
mandamus, or prohibition shall be obtained in a proceeding
under this article. Wherever in any statute reference is made
to a writ or order of certiorari, mandamus or prohibition,
such reference shall, so far as applicable, be deemed to refer
to the proceeding authorized by this article. ...
Id.
9 MacFarlane, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 351-52.
97 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . .. ."
Id.; N.Y. CONS'I. art. I, § 8. Article I, Section eight of the New York
Constitution provides in pertinent part: "Every citizen may freely speak, write,
and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of
speech or of the press." Id.
9 MacFarlane, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
99 Id.
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However, because the interests of the village in operating its
police force efficiently and effectively outweighed petitioner's
free speech rights, 1°° petitioner, MacFarlane, was not entitled to
the protection granted by the First Amendment.'°'
The use of a 911 emergency call system in Schenectady County
had been the topic of intense public debate and of ongoing
coverage by the press.1(2 This included the publication of several
letters written by various union leaders, including the petitioner,
who were opposed to the positions taken by the Village of
Scotia's Mayor and Chief of Police.1cn In order to effectuate the
emergency call system, the village's Board of Trustees considered
several different dispatch plans.0 4 One of the dispatch plans
which was favored by the Scotia Police Benevolent Association
called for the Village of Scotia's Police Department to handle the
911 calls. 'O' In contrast, the plan favored by the Board of
Trustees provided that the citizens of the Town of Glenville act as
the dispatchers for the 911 calls."° On the night of the Board of
Trustees' meeting to select the dispatch plan to be used by the
village, a letter, written by petitioner, the vice-president of the
Scotia Police Benevolent Association, was delivered to each of
the four trustees.137 This letter highlighted what the "petitioner
perceived to be the deficiencies in the plan favored by the Board
10o Id.
101 Id. at 354. The Appellate Division, Third Department also held that:
The regulations which Officer MacFarlane was charged
with violating were not unconstitutionally vague; 2)
substantial evidence did not support the finding that
MacFarlane intentionally disregarded a lawful order; 3)
substantial evidence did support charges based on
MacFarlane's use of intemperate language; 4) but a
reprimand, rather than a suspension, would have been an
appropriate punishment under the circumstances.
Id. at 353.
102 Id. at 353.
10 3 Id.
'
1 4 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 id.
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of Trustees.""0 8 While petitioner's letter criticized the Chief of
Police and the Mayor, there was no public discredit with respect
to the Chief or the Mayor, or to their offices.' However, it was
the Mayor, one of the recipients of the letter, who had it
publicized. 10  Shortly after the publication of the letter, the
Village of Scotia, pursuant to Civil Service Law section 75(1),"'
served petitioner with a notice and a statement of the charges
against him."' These charges alleged twelve incidents of
misconduct which were based upon the contents of his letter.1
3
Following these events, the Board of Trustees appointed a
hearing officer, who, dismissed the portions of the charges
pertaining to the Mayor following an evidentiary hearing," 4
Ultimately, the hearing officer found the petitioner guilty of the
remaining charges. "' Pursuant to the hearing officer's findings,
108 Id. The letter written by the petitioner included the following:
It is the Chiefs letter to the editor I find more interesting.
As president of the Police Benevolent Association when Paul
Boyarin came to Scotia and current vice-president, I have
made it very clear to our members that Chief Boyarin is a
provisional Chief and as such is subject to the whim and
pleasure of the Mayor. Until he becomes permanent and can
speak freely he is a tool of the Mayor. With this in mind we
have not said anything to, for, or against the Chief, and have
kept him out of our comments about plan three etc. I was
very surprised (as were many people I talked to) that the
Chief of Police would jump into this political pot to publicly
shaft his men and the Police Benevolent Association and suck
up to the Mayor in the same article. This was uncalled for
and did harm to the Department and the Chief's image.
Id.
109 Id.
I10 Id.
.. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 75(1) (McKinney 1982). Section 75(1) states:
"Removal and other disciplinary action. A person.. .shall not be removed or
otherwise subjected to any disciplinary penalty provided in this section except
for incompetency or misconduct shown after a hearing upon stated charges
pursuant to this section." Id.
" MacFarlane, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
113 Id.
114 id.
15 id.
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it was recommended that petitioner be suspended from work for
two weeks without pay." 6 The Board of Trustees adopted the
hearing officer's findings and recommendations, and suspended
the petitioner without pay for ten working days." 7 Petitioner then
brought an Article 78 proceeding.1
8
The Appellate Division began its analysis by addressing the
petitioner's initial argument of protection under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. "9 The court
agreed with the petitioner's contention that the letter addressed a
matter of public concern.1' However, the court stated that the
Village of Scotia could "justify its restriction of the petitioner's
speech if it can show that its interest in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees
outweighed the petitioner's interest in commenting on a matter of
public concern."' 2 ' Accordingly, the court further noted that
"[b]ecause the government, as an employer, must have wide
discretion and control over the management of its personnel and
internal affairs, its interest in achieving its goals as efficiently and
effectively as possible is a significant one." '
In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union,'3
government employees filed a suit claiming that their First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech were being abridged by a
statute which prohibited them from receiving honorariums for
speeches made or articles written.'2 4 After granting certiorari to
16 Id.
117 Id.
118Id.
119 Id. at 353-54.
120 Id. at 353.
2 Id. (citing United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S.
454 (1995); Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Township High School Dist. 205,
391 U.S. 563 (1968); Matter of Zaretsky v. New York City Health and Hosps.
Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 140, 638 N.E.2d 986, 615 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1994)).
122 Id. at 353-54 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994);
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).
123 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
1 2 Id. at 461. The speeches and articles for which respondents had received
honoraria in the past concerned matters such as religion, history, dance, and
the environment. Id at 461-62.
1998 1057
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hear the matter, the United States Supreme Court held the statute
violated the First Amendment." The Supreme Court further
held that this was a situation where government employees
sought, as ordinary citizens, to comment on matters of public
concern, as opposed to speaking on matters of a more personal
nature.1 26  There was a need for the government to satisfy a
balancing test similar to the one set forth in Pickering v. Board of
Education,27 in order to "maintain a statutory restriction on the
employees' speech."1 28 The government must specifically show
that "[t]he interests of both potential audiences and a vast group
of present and future employees in a broad range of present and
future expression were outweighed by that expression's necessary
impact on the actual operation of the government." 1
29
,25 Id. at 470.
126 Id at 466.
127 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Pickering, the Board of Education dismissed a
teacher for publishing and writing a letter in a newspaper which criticized the
Board's allocation of the school's funds between athletic programs and
educational programs, as well as "the Board's and superintendent's methods of
informing, or in preventing the informing of the district's taxpayers of the real
reasons why there were additional tax revenues being sought for the schools."
Id. at 564. The Board charged that many of the statements in the letter were
false and that the publication of the letter "unjustifiably impugned the Board
and school administration." Id. at 566-67. In its opinion, the Supreme Court
stated: "The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between interests of
the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services through its employees. Id. at 568.
11 United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454
(1995). The Supreme Court stated:
Because the honoraria ban constitutes a wholesale deterrent
to a broad category of expression by a massive number of
potential speakers, the Government's burden here is even
greater than it was in Pickering and its progeny, which
usually involved individual disciplinary actions taken in
response to particular Government employees' actual speech.
Id. at 466-67.
129 Id. at 468. The Supreme Court held the honoraria ban imposed a burden
on the Government employees by "[i]nducing them to curtail their expression
if they wished to continue their employment." Id. at 469. Furthermore, the
Court held that the ban imposed a far greater burden on them than on the far
1058 [Vol 14
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The facts in the Court of Appeals of New York decision of
Zaretsky v. Hospitals Corporation'30 were similar to those in the
instant case.' 31  In Zaretsky, a former employee of a hospital
owned and operated by a public employer sought reinstatement,
through an Article 78 proceeding, to his positions at the
hospital.' 32 Zaretsky claimed his discharge "violated his rights of
free speech, free association, and access to courts." 33 Zaretsky's
discharge came after he authorized a lawsuit against the
hospital.TM  As the president of a non-profit organization,
Zaretsky was expected to support the organization of the hospital,
however, the hospital thought he was misusing funds and they
demanded an inquiry.135  Believing the hospital had no right to
such an inquiry, Zaretsky filed suit against them.'3 6 The Court of
Appeals ultimately dismissed Zaretsky's petition because he was
unable to meet the requisite burden of proof necessary in showing
how his removal violated his constitutional rights. 31
The overarching factor in MacFarlane38 was that "[a] police
force is a quasi-military organization demanding strict
discipline." 39 Since the Village of Scotia's police force was so
smaller group of lawmakers, whose past actions motivated the enactment of the
ban, and the ban imposed a burden on the public's right to be able to read and
hear what Government employees have to write and say. Id at 469-70.
'30 84 N.Y.2d 140, 638 N.E.2d 986, 615 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1994).
131 MacFarlane v. Village of Scotia, 659 N.Y.S.2d 351 (3d Dep't 1997).
132Zaretsky, 84 N.Y.2d at 142, 638 N.E.2d at 987, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 342.
133 Id.
134 d. at 142-43, 638 N.E.2d at 987, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 342.
,
3 5 Id. at 143, 638 N.E.2d at 987, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 342.
136 id.
37 Id. at 145, 638 N.E.2d at 989, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 344. The New York
Court of Appeals held that "[a]s a public employer, HHC is under no
constitutional or legal obligation to retain an employee whose conduct the
public employer deems disruptive of its operation... [t]hus, when petitioner's
constitutional rights are balanced against HHC's interests in effectively and
efficiently discharging its mandate, HHC's interests must prevail." Id.
"I MacFarlane v. Village of Scotia, 659 N.Y.S.2d 351 (3d Dep't 1997).
139 Id. at 354 (citing Laspisa v. Mahoney, 198 A.D.2d 279, 603 N.Y.S.2d
536 (2d Dep't 1993)). In Laspisa, a Suffolk County Sheriff was found guilty
of misconduct after fraternizing with an inmate and continuing that relationship
after the inmate was released. Id. at 279, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 536-37. The court
1998 1059
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small, it "[m]andated a close relationship between its Chief of
Police and officers if it was to operate efficiently and
effectively." 140 It became evident, according to the MacFarlane
court that this relationship was placed in jeopardy by the
petitioner's letter, and therefore, the village's interests were
determined to have outweighed the petitioner's. 141
The New York State Constitution also provides for freedom of
speech.142  While this provision may be more specific than the
Federal Constitution both can trace their foundations to the same
underlying purposes. Both clauses seek to protect an individual
from being persecuted due to the expressions of that individual's
personal opinions.143 However, it appears that this right is not
absolute. 14 Although the MacFarlane court initially found that
the letter written by MacFarlane would normally fall under the
protection of the First Amendment, it held that MacFarlane's free
expression of rights must be balanced against the Village's
interest in operating its police force efficiently and effectively. 145
Here, the court found that MacFarlane's rights must give way to
the greater interest of the Village.'
46
The purpose behind both the New York State and Federal
Constitutions is the same, an inherent desire to protect an
individual's freedom to express themselves through the spoken or
written word. Both provisions re-enforce the notions of freedoms
held that due to the police force being a quasi-military organization which
demanded strict discipline, the "[p]etitioner's conduct cannot be condoned
since such behavior poses a serious threat to the discipline and efficiency of the
agency's operation." Id. at 279, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 537.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. Article I, section eight provides in pertinent
part: "Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
143 See supra notes 98.
144 See Zaretsky v. Health and Hospitals Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 140, 638 N.E.2d
986, 615 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1994); MacFarlane v. Village of Scotia, 659
N.Y.S.2d 351 (3d Dep't 1997).
"I MacFarlane, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 353-54.
1
4 6 Id. at 354.
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which this country was originally built upon. Although it is
important for people to be able to express themselves freely, it is
also important to place limits or boundaries upon these rights to
ensure protection from abuse. While the freedom of speech was
formed to help build a more perfect society, the legal limitations
on these rights were created to perform the exact same function.
Urbach v. Farrell 47
(decided April 17, 1997)
Petitioner, the Commissioner of Taxation, was given legislative
approval in 1995 to enter into a contract to privatize the
processing of New York State's income tax returns. 4 In 1996,
respondent, the Ways and Means Committee of the State
Assembly [hereinafter committee] ... served the petitioner with
a legislative subpoena requesting that he appear at a hearing and
produce a copy of the contract, designated PIT 2000, for its
review.'49  Petitioner provided an incomplete version of the
contract to the committee and further requested that the
committee withdraw the legislative subpoena.5  Since the
committee refused to withdraw the subpoena, petitioner instituted
a proceeding to have the subpoena modified or quashed.' The
Supreme Court granted the request to have the subpoena quashed
to the extent that the petitioner was not required to appear
personally for the hearing. However, the Supreme Court
required the petitioner to produce the entire PIT 2000 contract."
147 229 A.D.2d 275, 656 N.Y.S.2d 448 (3d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 90
N.Y.2d 888, 684 N.E.2d 282, 661 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1997).148 Id. at 276, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
149 Id. at 276, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 449-50.
150 Id. at 277, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
151 Id.
15 Id.
153 id.
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